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11 Introduction
Decision-making entities are often comprised of agents who represent diﬀerent interests.
The most obvious example of such a decision-making institution is the government in a
representative democracy. If the consequences of the decision are uncertain, the quality of
the decision beneﬁts from exchanging information prior to making a choice. However, in
case committee members’ interests are not completely aligned, we cannot take information
exchange for granted. Should we worry about preference heterogeneity interfering with
information aggregation? This is the question the paper is concerned with.
The idea that committee members pool private information relevant for the decision,
and therewith make use of a broader information base than a single decision maker could
access, dates back at least to Condorcet (1785). The advantage of involving a higher num-
ber of informed agents in the decision process is intuitive if the committee indeed makes
use of the committee members’ private information. However, if committee members’
interests are not completely aligned, this cannot be taken for granted.
A recent game-theoretic literature has shown that we cannot take eﬃcient information
aggregation for granted even if preferences are perfectly aligned (e.g. Austen-Smith and
Banks, 1996; for a survey see Gerling et al., 2005). The reason is that the individual
voter cares only about his vote when it is pivotal. Obviously, there exist equilibria in
which no single vote ever aﬀects the outcome and voters do not use their information.
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) show (in a voting setting without communication) that
the exploitation of all available information is generally not possible in equilibrium. But
Condorcet’s jury theorem may still apply to strategically acting agents with completely
aligned preferences (McLennan, 1998), since they play a common interest game.
Conﬂicting interests among committee members may limit their ability to pool their
information eﬃciently. When preferences are heterogeneous, it is not straightforward to
decide how decision quality should be measured. One such measure used in the literature
(e.g. Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997, 1998; Gerardi 2000) is the extent of information
aggregation, i.e. the probability with which the collective decision would be the same if all
2the information was common knowledge. In this paper, we will also use this benchmark.
Full information aggregation is desirable if committee members agree on which decision
to make if the state of the world is known. Then, preferences are heterogeneous in the
sense that voters diﬀer with respect to their ’thresholds of doubt’, i.e. with respect to
how convinced a voter must be that a certain alternative is the correct choice in order to
support that alternative.
In voting games without communication, full information aggregation requires that
private information is transmitted via individual votes. If preferences are too heteroge-
neous, then full information aggregation via majority voting is impossible because beliefs
concentrate around the threshold of doubt of the politically decisive voter, the median
preference type. Voters whose thresholds are too far away from the median do not condi-
tion their votes on information (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997).
On the other hand, committee members – at least in small committees – generally
have access to another instrument to pool their information other than individual votes:
they may exchange views prior to making a decision. In this regard, the information
aggregation potential of committees is still not well understood. Most papers restrict
attention to voting and neglect the role of communication within the committee. Excep-
tions are Coughlan (2000), Doraszelski et al. (2003), Gerardi and Yariv (2003a, b), and
Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2002). Coughlan (2000) and Gerardi and Yariv (2003b) deal
with committees composed of agents with homogeneous preferences for which complete
information aggregation is possible because agents share a common goal.
The papers by Doraszelski et al. (2001) and Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2002)
indicate that in committees with heterogeneous preferences, information aggregation is
severely limited even if pre-vote communication is allowed. In these papers, information
is soft and preferences are assumed to be private information. In such a setting, agents
with extreme preferences always make statements which favor their preferred decision.
Hence, in equilibrium, the information content of a statement is limited. Austen-Smith
(1990a,b) studies information transmission in an agenda-setting game where preferences
are common knowledge and information is soft. Information transmission is possible only
3if preferences are suﬃciently aligned.
Chwe (1999), Persico (2004), Gerardi et al. (2005), and Chwe (2006) propose infor-
mation eliciting by means of distorting the decision or manipulating agents’ payoﬀs via a
bet on the state of the world. In this paper, we are not interested in optimal mechanisms.
Instead, we want to study a widely used one: discussions followed by majority voting. We
identify conditions for the existence of equilibria in which information is fully aggregated,
i.e in which the decision is the same as if all signals were common knowledge.
We follow the existing literature and model the decision procedure as a deliberat-
ing process followed by a voting phase, but we study a diﬀerent information environment.
We assume that the decision-relevant private information is veriﬁable. That is, committee
members are assumed to be aware of facts which can be proven. This assumption corre-
sponds well to committees whose members are experts on the issue. An example would
be a board of examiners who have to propose a candidate for a grant. Decision-relevant
facts could for instance be the candidate’s performance in individual examiners’ courses
which is veriﬁable, but private information.1 We provide more examples for our setting in
the next section. Transmission of veriﬁable information has been studied e.g. in Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) and Banerjee and Somanathan (2001), where an informed party or
several informed parties try to inﬂuence a decision maker by revealing information. In
contrast to these papers, informed parties participate in the decision process. Moreover,
their preferred decision may also depend on the other agents’ information. One could
presume that players are able to force each other to reveal veriﬁable information. In our
model, there is no means for players to aﬀect each other’s payoﬀs except for the decision
they collectively make.
In the basic model, we assume that preferences are common knowledge. This assump-
tion is well in accordance with situations in which decision makers are elected in order
1It is likely that in reality, there is soft information on top of that. In this paper, we deal only with
the aggregation of hard information. As soft information communication games always have babbling
equilibria, we could assume that if there was soft information which somebody tried to communicate,
nobody would listen.
4to represent diﬀerent interests (like in a representative democracy), or with situations in
which members are sent into the committee as a representative of an aﬀected group (like
in hiring committees). Our analysis provides a more optimistic view on the information
aggregation potential of heterogeneous committees than previous work does. We show
that an equilibrium exists in which information is perfectly aggregated. This is not the
case in the games studied by Doraszelski et al. (2001) and Austen-Smith and Feddersen
(2002). The reason is that in our set-up, committee members may be able to perfectly
deduce the information of a voter who does not reveal it voluntarily. By not communi-
cating his private information, a voter reveals that he possesses information he does not
want to reveal. This contains exactly the same information as revealing the information
itself. If information is soft (see also Austen-Smith (1990a,b)) the option to report false
information destroys the opportunity to credibly transmit this information if it is indeed
the truth.
Private information concerning preferences and soft information concerning the quality
of the decision are good assumptions for novel and rare decision situations, whereas the
approach in our basic model is well in accordance with committees consisting of experts
who know each other, or whose interests can be inferred from their role in the committee.
Examples are representative governments, hiring committees, or boards of directors.
We extent our basic model into two directions and derive conditions for full informa-
tion aggregation in each extended set-up. First, we allow for the possibility that some
agents are not endowed with decision-relevant information. Moreover, we examine an
environment in which preferences are private information. Last, we combine these two
modiﬁcations and consider a framework in which preferences are private information and
in which there is the possibility that agents are not endowed with information.
In the modiﬁed versions of the model, full information aggregation is possible only
if the preference parameter range is restricted. If committee members are not endowed
with information with certainty, full information revelation in the communication stage
is possible if and only if interests are completely aligned. The reason is that committee
members with information which is unfavorable for their favorite decision can pretend to
5have no information. Strongly biased committee members prefer to conceal such informa-
tion. However, we can show that there exists an equilibrium in which every committee
member reveals at least one type of information, and each type of information is revealed
by more than half of the committee members (if they possess such information) for cases
in which the probability of receiving information is high enough.
If preferences are private information, there exists an equilibrium in which information
is completely revealed if preference diversity is not too extreme. Committee members are
uncertain about the majority’s preferred alternative. As it is possible that the majority’s
interests are aligned with their own, committee members have an incentive to provide
information. This is supported by a belief system with the property that information
revelation does not harm in cases in which the majority’s preferred decision deviates from
one’s own. Uncertainty about the majority’s preferences may provide incentives for infor-
mation revelation if committee members do not possess information with certainty. There
exist equilibria with full information revelation for preference parameter constellations for
which this is not the case if preferences are common knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the model setup is presented.
We derive the full information aggregation result of the basic model in Section 3. In
Section 4 the extensions to the basic model are analyzed and conditions under which
full information aggregation is possible are derived. In the ﬁnal section we conclude and
outline possible directions for future research.
2 The basic model
A collective decision x ∈ {a,b} is made by majority voting without abstentions in a
committee consisting of n members. For the ease of exposition (to avoid ties), let n be an
odd number. Utility from the decision is state-dependent. There are two possible states
of nature ω ∈ {A,B}, and uncertainty about its realization. Ex ante both states are
equally likely.
Each agent i receives a signal σi ∈ {α,β} which is correlated with the true state of
6the world:
prob{σi = α|ω = A} = prob{σi = β |ω = B} = q, 1
2 < q < 1 ∀i.
The signals are drawn independently conditional on the state. A signal contains veriﬁable
information. Prior to voting, there is the possibility to communicate within the committee.
Veriﬁability of information implies that committee members cannot invent information:
they can either report the information they are endowed with or stay silent.
Examples for this decision environment are the following:
• x ∈ {stick to the status quo, implement a reform}; ω ∈ {the reform causes higher
costs than beneﬁts, the beneﬁts outweigh the costs}; σi ∈ {presumptive evidence for
either state: a certain group looses surely but little, the reform worked in a neighbor
state, etc.}
• x ∈ {hire a new researcher, not}; ω ∈ {researcher is brilliant, researcher is mediocre};
σi ∈ {presumptive evidence for either state: researcher has a joint paper in a leading
journal; researcher performed badly at a conference, etc.}
• x ∈ {conviction of a defendant; acquittal}; ω ∈ {defendant is guilty, defendant is
innocent}; σi ∈ {presumptive evidence for either state: defendant would have had
a good reason to commit the crime, defendant has never been conspicuous so far,
etc.}
The timing is as follows:
1. Nature draws the state of the world and an imperfect signal for every agent.
2. Agents may reveal their signal to the other agents.
3. Agents vote. The alternative which receives the most votes is implemented.
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. That is, at each possible
node of the game in which a player is asked to take an action, the action is required to
be a best response to the other players’ strategies given the beliefs, and beliefs shall be
consistent with equilibrium strategies.
72.1 Agents
Agents derive state-dependent utility from the collective decision, Ui = ui (x,ω). They
are Bayesians and seek to maximize expected utility taking into account all available
information. Let pi (ω = A) denote the probability which agent i assigns to state of the
world A given the information available to him.
Agent i’s expected utility from decision a is:
pi (ω = A)ui (a,A) + (1 − pi (ω = A))ui (a,B),
and from b :
(1 − pi (ω = A))ui (b,B) + pi (ω = A)ui (b,A).
Throughout the analysis, we assume a certain degree of homogeneity in preferences,
which ensures that the desirability of decision a weakly increases in the probability that
state A realized for each agent.2
Assumption 1 ui (a,A) + ui (b,B) − ui (a,B) − ui (b,A) > 0 ∀i.
Agent i prefers the implementation of a over b, iﬀ
pi (ω = A) >
ui (b,B) − ui (a,B)




ui(a,A)+ui(b,B)−ui(a,B)−ui(b,A). Arrange the names of agents i = 1,...n such
that θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ ... ≤ θn, and denote the median type, θn+1
2 , with θm. Following (among
others) Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), θi is called i’s threshold of doubt. Agent i
prefers a over b if and only if he assesses the probability that the state of the world is A
higher than his threshold of doubt. Agents i : θi < 0 prefer decision a in both states of
the world, and agents j : θj > 1 prefer decision b in both states of the world. The present
paper allows for a larger preference parameter range than most of the existing literature
2If Assumption 1 does not hold, the number of voters who prefer decision a over decision b may not
be monotone in the probability that state A realized. The analysis then requires to consider all possible
shapes which this relationship may have.
8(e.g. Fedderson and Pesendorfer (1998) or Doraszelski et al. (2001)), where attention is
restricted to the case θi ∈ [0,1].
Agents l : θl ∈ [0,1] agree which decision should be made under certainty. Hence
there are incentives to pool private information in order to get a better estimate about
the true state of the world. However, heterogeneous thresholds of doubt potentially cause
disagreement at the time the decision has to be taken. Therefore, agents may not want
to reveal their information if this could cause the politically decisive voter to vote against
their preferred alternative.
Preferences are common knowledge. We preclude the implementation of transfer
schemes. Reasons for this restriction are that either (i) there exists no authority which is
able to collect the transfers after the decision was implemented and the state of the world
was learned, (ii) the state of the world is not veriﬁable, and/or (iii) individual rationality
and budget constraints cannot be satisﬁed simultaneously.3
2.2 Information Processing
As utility is state-dependent, agents would like to condition their choice on the state of
the world. The state of the world is not observable, but correlated with individual signals.
Agents use the information about the realization of the signals for updating their beliefs
concerning the realization of the state of the world. Firstly, each agent observes a signal,
which alters his beliefs about the state and about the distribution of signals held by the
other committee members. Secondly, agents observe the communication outcome and
therewith the realization of a subset of the signals. Moreover, they are able to interpret
the actions of those committee members who did not reveal their information. Last,
each agent is aware of the fact that in equilibrium his vote aﬀects the outcome only for
particular realizations of the other voters’ signals.
Suppose for the moment that the realization of private information σi, i = 1,...n
3If we could align preferences over the collective decision by a payoﬀ manipulation ui (x,ω) via a
transfer scheme {ti (x,ω),x = a,b;ω = A,B;i = 1,...n}, beneﬁcial information aggregation would be
no problem.
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Figure 1: Probability that the state of the world is A given the evidence k.
is common knowledge. Since the information environment is symmetric (i.e. p(A) =
1/2, prob(σi = α|ω = A) = prob(σi = β|ω = B) ∀i), the only information which matters
for updating beliefs with respect to the realization of the state of the world is the diﬀerence
between the number of α-signals and β-signals.4 Denote this random variable with κ. We
have κ =
 n
i=1 1σi=α − 1σi=β, where 1σi=ˆ σ = 1 if σi = ˆ σ and 0 else. Bayesian updating
yields:
p(A|κ = k) =
qk
qk + (1 − q)
k. (2)
Figure 1 depicts the probability that the state of the world is A given there are k more
α-signals than β-signals.5
If the realization of some σj, j = 1,...n, (and hence of κ) is not known, agent i has
to form beliefs  i(σj), i  = j, with respect to these realizations, incorporating all available
information. We denote with κ−i the diﬀerence between the number of α-signals and
β-signals held by committee members except for i. The beliefs held with respect to the
4See Appendix.
5Note that (as n is an odd number) κ assumes even values with positive probability only if some agents
do not receive information, see Sections 4.1 and 4.3.
10other agents’ signals can be transformed into a belief regarding κ−i.6
 i(κ−i = k) =

      






 i(σj = α)
 
l∈{1,...n}\{J∪i}
 i(σl = β),
for k ∈ E{−n + 1,...,n − 1}
0, for k / ∈ {−n + 1,...,n − 1},
(3)
where E{x,...,y} denotes the set of even integers between (including) x and y. Taking
his own signal and κ = κ−i +1σi=α−1σi=β into account, i’s belief regarding κ is given by:




 i(κ−i = k + 1), if σi = α
 i(κ−i = k − 1), if σi = β.
(4)
Agent i’s belief regarding the state of the world is then given by:
pi(ω = A) =
 
k∈O{−n,...,n}
 i(κ = k)p(A|κ = k), (5)
where O{−n,...n} is the set of odd integers between −n and n, and  i(κ) is updated
whenever the agent receives new information. There are several stages at which the beliefs
can be updated.7 Firstly, the agent learns his own signal σi. Secondly, the other agents’
observed communication actions contain information. Moreover, agents may be able to
deduce information through equilibrium voting strategies. They care only about their
vote when it is pivotal, hence they update their beliefs using the information contained in
this event. If the event that i is pivotal never occurs in equilibrium, basically any beliefs
can be assigned, provided that they do not contradict Bayes’ Law.
Figure 2 depicts a possible path of belief-updating for an agent in a committee with
ﬁve agents. The illustrations represent agent i’s beliefs with respect to κ at diﬀerent stages
of the game. Note that positive probability is assigned only to odd values for κ because
there is an odd number of signals. Ex ante, the probability that kα agents receive α-signals











7For convenience, we use the term ’updating’ even if the updating does not change an agents’ assess-
ment.
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Figure 2: Possible path of updating in the course of the game with 5 players.
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where k ∈ O{−n,...n}.
After having learned that his signal is α, i assigns positive probability only to κ ∈
































Suppose that i was shown one β in the communication stage, and that those who stayed
silent planned to do so for both types of signals.8 Then, i can exclude κ = 5 and conclude
pi(ω = A) = 1/2. At the stage of voting, he again updates his beliefs, assigning positive
probability only to those κ which – given the voting strategy proﬁle – may render his
vote decisive. Suppose that the voter who revealed the β-signal votes for b, that one of
the remaining voters votes for a irrespective of his information, and that the other two
voters vote informatively, that is each of them votes for a if his signal is α, and votes for
b if his signal is β. Then, i’s vote is decisive if and only if those who vote informatively
have opposing signals.
2.3 The communication stage
The agents are allowed to reveal the signal they received from nature prior to the voting
stage. As a signal contains veriﬁable information, agents cannot lie about their infor-
mation. A communication strategy γi for an agent i is a plan whether to report his
information (σi) or to remain silent (s) for each signal he may receive. Communication
takes place simultaneously and is observed by all voters.9
8If a voter j reveals an α-signal with a higher probability than a β-signal, beliefs formed after observing
j’s silence would take this into account, assigning higher probability to σj = β.
9The full information aggregation result (Proposition 1) does not hinge upon the assumption of si-
multaneous communication.
13Let C denote the set of possible outcomes of the communication stage. An outcome of
the communication stage is denoted c = (c1,c2,...cn), where ci ∈ {α,β,s} ∀i = 1,...n.
Denote with A(c) the set of agents who revealed α-signals, A(c) = {i ∈ {1,...n} : ci = α}.
Deﬁne B(c) and S(c) analogously. The most important summaries of the information
provided in the communication stage are the number of revealed α-signals, kα(c) = |A(c)|,
the number of revealed β-signals, kβ(c) = |B(c)|, and the number of unrevealed signals,
ks(c) = |S(c)|. Denote with k(c) = kα(c) − kβ(c) the number of revealed α-signals in
excess of the number of β-signals. We call k(c) evidence, and say that the communication
stage produced evidence for A if k(c) > 0, evidence for B if k(c) < 0 and no evidence if
k(c) = 0.
Having observed j’s communication action, i updates his belief regarding the realiza-
tion of j’s signal. Denote with  i(σj = α|cj = ˆ c) the probability which i assigns to σj = α
given j’s communication action ˆ c. Because communication strategies are restricted to
either truthful revelation or no revelation, we have that  i(σj = α|cj = α) = 1, and
 i(σj = α|cj = β) = 0. Beliefs regarding the signals of voters j : j ∈ S(c) must be
consistent with these agents’ communication strategies along the equilibrium path, and
have to respect Bayes’ Rule oﬀ the equilibrium path.
2.4 The voting stage
Agents vote simultaneously and without abstentions for an alternative to be implemented.
The alternative which gets the most votes is implemented. Every agent takes into account
all the information available to him, that is the own signal σi, the communication outcome
c, and what he can learn through equilibrium play. In particular, agents base their votes
on being pivotal.
A voting strategy vi for agent i is a plan for which alternative to vote, for all possi-
ble outcomes of the communication stage and for each signal he may receive. Allowing
for mixed voting strategies, we have vi : {α,β} × C → [0,1], where vi(.) denotes the





Figure 3: Bayesian sincere voting strategy





1, if pi (ω = A) > θi
0, if pi (ω = A) < θi
is called Bayesian sincere voting.
Recalling (1), it is easy to see that a Bayesian sincere voting strategy maximizes i’s
expected utility. Moreover, if the voting strategy proﬁle allows the event that i is pivotal
to occur, the beliefs  i(κ) are well-deﬁned and Bayesian sincere voting is the only utility-
maximizing strategy. However, if an agent is never pivotal, any voting action is utility-
maximizing, since none has an eﬀect. Therefore, Bayesian sincere voting is always in the
best response set at the stage of voting for every player. Figure 3 depicts a Bayesian
sincere voting strategy for voter i. Assume again that the realization of the signals –
and hence the realization k of κ – is common knowledge. Then, using Bayesian sincere
voting strategies, agents i with thresholds of doubt θi < p(A|κ = k) vote for a, and
agents j : θi > p(A|κ = k) vote for b. An agent’s threshold of doubt reﬂects how much
evidence for state of the world A must be presented to the agent such that he supports
alternative a. For convenience, we assume that the voter with the median preference type
is never indiﬀerent between a and b if the realization of κ is known with certainty. This
assumption is made without loss of generality to avoid case diﬀerentiations. Alternatively,
if he is indiﬀerent between the two alternatives, we could restrict attention to equilibria
in which the median preference type takes a particular action, say vote for a.
Assumption 2 ∃km ∈ {−n,...n} such that p(A|κ = km) < θm < p(A|κ = km + 1).
153 Full information aggregation
Both, preferences over the set of alternatives and beliefs regarding the state of the world
may diﬀer among voters. Voter i with preferences θi does not want alternative a to be
implemented as long as he assesses the probability that the state of the world is A to
be smaller than θi. Communication allows for the possibility to inﬂuence the politically
decisive voter – and consequently the collective decision – in one’s own favor. Whether or
not a voter has the possibility to inﬂuence the decision in his favor depends on the kind
of information he is endowed with. Thus, the sheer possibility to communicate may cause
information exchange, even if the committee members do not talk to each other.
It is easy to see that an equilibrium exists in which the information is fully revealed
and taken into account by every voter when making the voting choice. The result is stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The following strategy proﬁle is a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
the communication-and-voting-game: All agents reveal their information in the commu-
nication stage. All agents assign probability 1 to κ = k(c). Agents whose thresholds of
doubt are smaller than p(A|κ = k(c)) vote a, the other agents vote b. If ci = s is observed,
and θi ≥ θm, voters j  = i assign probability 1 to σi = α and play voting strategies as if
i had revealed α. If ci = s is observed, and θi < θm, voters j  = i assign probability 0 to
σi = α and play voting strategies as if i had revealed β.
Proof. We have to distinguish two cases: (i) km is odd, and (ii) km is even. Consider
agent i : θi ≥ θm. The only deviation in the communication stage which has an eﬀect is to
conceal β. In case (i), this deviation will change the outcome only if κ−i = km+1. If i sticks
to his equilibrium communication action, all voters believe (know) that κ = km, and assess
the probability that the state of the world is A to be p(A|κ = km). As θm > p(A|κ = km),
a majority votes for b. If i conceals β, the other agents believe that κ = km + 2 and
consequently that the probability that the state of the world is A is p(A|κ = km + 2).
θm < p(A|κ = km +1), hence a majority votes for a. In case (ii), i’s revelation aﬀects the
16outcome only if κ−i = km. If i sticks to his equilibrium communication action, all voters
believe that κ = km − 1, and a majority votes for b. If i conceals β, the other agents
believe that κ = km + 1 and consequently a majority votes for a. Since θi ≥ θm, agent i
prefers b over a in case his deviation has an eﬀect. Thus, i has no incentive to deviate in
the communication stage. The voting strategy is Bayesian sincere. Thus, there exists no
proﬁtable deviation. A similar argument applies to the case θi < θm. Note that beliefs
are consistent with Bayes’ Rule. Q.E.D.
The intuition for the result is as follows. Full information revelation is possible because
committee members may apply the following reasoning: I know who you are, I know what
you want, and I know that you know something. If you don’t tell me what you know,
then I suppose that you have information which is unfavorable for your favorite decision
because otherwise you would have told me.
In equilibrium, every agent has an incentive to reveal at least one type of information,
given he possesses it: Agents who are more biased towards a than the median preference
type prefer alternative a whenever the majority prefers a. Hence, they have an incentive
to reveal α-signals in order to convince the majority of alternative a. Agents who are
biased towards b have an incentive to provide β-signals. By not revealing what he knows,
an agent reveals that he does not know anything he wants to reveal. As all agents know
something, staying silent reveals exactly the same information as the revelation of the
information itself, and amounts to be a superﬂuous action.
4 Extensions to the basic model
In this section, we modify the basic setting along two dimensions and identify conditions
under which full information revelation in the communication stage is possible. First we
allow for the possibility that agents do not possess decision-relevant information with a
certain probability. In this case, agents with unfavorable information can pool with agents
who have no information. Hence, it may not always be possible to perfectly deduce the
information endowment of a committee member who does not talk. Next, we consider the
17case that preferences are private information. Then it is impossible to assume ’worst news’
in case of a player’s silence because it is private information what would be bad news.
In both modiﬁcations of the basic model, full information aggregation is possible only if
committee members’ preferences are suﬃciently aligned. However, there may still be a
large range of preference parameters for which full information aggregation is possible.
Interestingly, if there is the possibility that agents do not receive information, then a
full information aggregation equilibrium exists for a larger preference parameter range if
preferences are private information then if they are common knowledge.
We identify conditions for the existence of equilibria in which all signals are revealed
in the communication stage and call these equilibria full information revelation equilibria.
One could presume that the existence of such an equilibrium is not necessary for full
information aggregation, as non-revealed information may still be aggregated in the voting
stage. We will show that if the extended model does not have a full information revelation
equilibrium, then there neither exists a full information aggregation equilibrium.
4.1 Possibility of receiving no signal
In the basic model, full information aggregation is possible because committee members
may apply the reasoning ”I know what you want, and I know that you know something.
If you don’t tell me what you know, then I suppose that you have information which is
unfavorable for your favorite decision.” Here, we eliminate the ”I know that you know
something” part from this line of argumentation. We assume that each committee member
receives a signal with probability δ < 1. If a voter is not endowed with information, we
denote σi = ∅. We assume that it is impossible to verify σi = ∅, and that this event is
equally likely in both states of the world. That is, the message spaces remain the same
as in the basic model for those agents who receive information, whereas those who do not
receive information are restricted to staying silent.
We modify nature’s moves in the following way:
1. Nature determines the set of agents ∆ ⊆ {1,...n} that she will endow with signals.
182. Nature draws the state of the world.
3. Nature draws a signal for each agent i ∈ ∆.
Suppose that full information revelation as in Proposition 1 was part of an equilibrium
in this game as well. Then, in this equilibrium, if a voter i does not reveal information
in the communication stage, the only admissible belief for the other voters is to assign
probability 1 to σi = ∅. In an equilibrium in which all the available information is
revealed in the communication stage,  i(κ) assigns probability 1 to κ = k(c) for all agents
i. Hence, it is rational for voter i to vote for a if p(A|κ = k(c)) > θi, and to vote for b if
p(A|κ = k(c)) < θi.
Consider agent i, σi = α, and assume that agents −i reveal any signal they receive from
nature, and hold the belief that if ci = s, then σi = ∅ with probability 1. Agent i is pivotal
with signal α if and only if κ−i = km. In this case the revelation would cause a majority
to vote for a, while a majority votes for b given only the evidence κ−i. If agents −i expect
i to reveal any information nature endows him with, they think he has no information
if he stays silent, and assign probability 1 to κ = km in case i deviates. A concealment
would not be noticed. However, whether or not he reveals his own signal to the other
agents, i would know that κ = km + 1, and assign probability p(A|κ = km + 1) to state
of the world A. Hence, he prefers the revelation of α if and only if θi < p(A|κ = km + 1).
With the same line of reasoning, we conclude that an agent i : σi = β reveals his signal if
and only if all the other agents reveal their signals if θi > p(A|κ = km).
Proposition 2 Consider a communication-and-voting-game in which each voter is en-
dowed with information with probability δ < 1. There exists a full information revelation
equilibrium if and only if θi ∈ [p(A|κ = km),p(A|κ = km + 1)] ∀i.
Full information revelation is possible if and only if all committee members agree
with the median preference type which decision should be made given the presented
evidence, i.e. if there is essentially no preference heterogeneity. However, there may still be
considerable information aggregation even in the presence of strongly diverging interests.
Suppose that there is an agent i : θi < p(A|κ = km). Agent i disagrees with the majority
19only insofar as they implement b in some cases in which i would better like a. This is
why i does not want to show a β-signal if he is endowed with it. However, agent i might
be willing to reveal an α-signal. The following proposition states that the existence of an
equilibrium with considerable information aggregation is guaranteed if δ is high enough.
Proposition 3 Consider a communication-and-voting-game in which each voter is en-
dowed with information with probability δ < 1. There is a lower bound on δ, δ′ < 1, such
that for all δ > δ′, there is a k with |k| < |km| such that, an equilibrium exists in which at
least n+1
2 agents reveal α-signals if they are endowed with them, at least n+1
2 agents reveal
β-signals if they are endowed with them, and all agents vote for a if k(c) ≥ k+1 and vote
for b if k(c) ≤ k.
We present the proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix. We show that given the beliefs
induced by a certain strategy proﬁle, it is possible to construct this strategy proﬁle such
that the strategies are mutually best responses and beliefs are indeed correct. For small
values of δ, the construction is possible for some preference parameter constellations, but
cannot be applied for the general case. The reason is that as δ goes to zero, beliefs
conditional on providing decisive information converge to p(ω = A|κ = k) and p(ω =
A|κ = k + 1), but are also sensitive to the communication strategy proﬁle. Hence,
we cannot guarantee that an equilibrium exists in which equilibrium beliefs concentrate
around the median preference type. The equilibrium identiﬁed in Proposition 3 has the
property that more than half of the agents reveal α-signals if they are endowed with them,
and more than half of the agents reveal β-signals if they are endowed with them. The
decision rule is such that less extreme evidence has to be presented in order to change
the decision as is necessary for the median preference type to change his mind in the
full information case. The reason is that the revelation of an additional α-signal aﬀects
beliefs in two ways, directly via the correlation, and indirectly because less unrevealed
information remains.
As δ → 1, k → km/2 for the class of equilibria identiﬁed in Proposition 3. Note that
for δ = 1, if half of the agents reveal either type of information, and the communication
20stage yields evidence k(c), it follows that κ = 2k(c). Hence, for δ = 1, the decision will be
a if and only if κ > km, which implies full information aggregation as in Proposition 1 also
in this class of equilibria. Although we may have considerable information aggregation
in the absence of a full information revelation equilibrium, full information aggregation is
impossible for δ < 1.
Proposition 4 Consider a communication-and-voting-game in which each voter is en-
dowed with information with probability δ < 1. If a full information revelation equilibrium
does not exist, then there exists no full information aggregation equilibrium.
Proof. Full information aggregation requires the following. If κ ≤ km, then there must
be at least n+1
2 b-votes. If κ > km, then there must be at least n+1
2 a-votes. This in turn is
feasible only (i) if a voter who did not reveal β votes b and would have voted a if σi = ∅,
and (ii) a voter who did not reveal α votes a and would have voted b if σi = ∅. As beliefs
must be consistent, an agent who votes b anticipates that in case his vote is pivotal, then
κ = km, and a pivotal agent who votes a infers that κ = km + 1. Hence, the required
voting strategies are consistent with equilibrium play only if θi ∈ [p(A|κ = km),p(A|κ =
km + 1)] ∀i. Then a full information revelation equilibrium exists. Q.E.D.
4.2 Private information concerning preferences
In this section, we assume that not only individual signals but also preferences are private
information. Therewith, we eliminate the ”I know what you want”-part from the line
of argumentation underlying Proposition 1. Agent i’s preference parameter θi is drawn
according to a commonly known probability function φ(θi), which is assumed to be iden-
tical for all i = 1,...n. The realization of θi is i’s private information. We denote the
distribution function of individual types with Φ(θi).
Nature’s moves are now as follows:
1. Nature draws the agents’ types.
2. Nature draws the state of the world.
213. Nature draws a signal for each committee member.
We are interested in conditions for the existence of a full information revelation equi-
librium. Clearly, agents with types above 1 (respectively below 0) would never reveal
information which makes the choice of a (respectively b) more likely. If all the other
agents reveal their information and vote Bayesian sincerely, the revelation of an α-signal
(respectively the revelation of a β-signal) necessarily has this eﬀect (if any). Hence, in
order that a full information revelation equilibrium exists, the support of φ(θi) must be
bounded. That is, there must exist θmin > 0, θmax < 1 such that θi ∈ [θmin,θmax]∀i. In
particular, for every i, there must be an integer kθi ∈ E{−n + 1,...,n − 1} such that
θi ∈ [p(A|κ = kθi − 1),p(A|κ = kθi + 1)], i.e. such that agent i prefers decision a for all
κ−i > kθi and prefers decision b for all κ−i < kθi. For κ−i = kθi, he prefers a if his own
signal is α, and b if his own signal is β.
In the following, we assume the existence of a full information revelation equilibrium
in which all agents vote Bayesian sincerely (which implies full information aggregation).
If all the information is revealed during the communication stage, then pi(ω = A) =
p(A|κ = k(c)) ∀i, and hence the agents’ Bayesian sincere voting strategies are unique.
In case of remaining uncertainty about decision-relevant information, Bayesian sincere
voting strategies are determined by the belief system  . Hence, the incentive to reveal
information - and therewith full information revelation in equilibrium - hinges upon the
beliefs agents hold in case of a deviation (i.e. a concealment of information). To derive
conditions for the existence of a full information revelation equilibrium, we specify beliefs  
which best support the full information revelation equilibrium. It suﬃces to specify these
beliefs for the case that a single agent conceals his information in the communication
stage.
Given that preferences are private information, it does not make sense to condition the
beliefs in case of i’s silence on i’s name. However, beliefs can be conditioned on the com-
munication outcome k(c). Denote with  −i(k(c)) =  −i (κ = k(c) + 1|κ−i = k(c),ci = s)









< kθmin no eﬀect - -
kθmin b → a [p(A|µ(kθmin)),
p(A|κ = kθmin + 1)]
kθi < kθmin + 1
kθi > kθmin + 1
ˆ k b → a
[p(A|µ(ˆ k)),
p(A|κ = ˆ k + 1)]
kθi < ˆ k + 1
kθi > ˆ k + 1
kθmax b → a [p(A|κ = µ(kθmax)),
p(A|κ = kθmax + 1)]
kθi < kθmax + 1
kθi > kθmax + 1








< kθmin no eﬀect - -
kθmin a → b [p(A|kθmin − 1),
p(A|µ(kθmin))]
kθi > kθmin − 1
kθi < kθmin − 1
ˆ k a → b
[p(A|κ = ˆ k − 1),
p(A|µ(ˆ k))]
kθi > ˆ k − 1
kθi < ˆ k − 1
kθmax a → b [p(A|κ = kθmax − 1),
p(A|µ(kθmax))]
kθi > kθmax − 1
kθi < kθmax − 1
> kmax no eﬀect - -
Figure 4: Possible eﬀects of i’s revelation given information revelation by agents −i.
23To see how these beliefs best support a full information revelation equilibrium, consider
the possible eﬀects of i’s revelation of the two types of signals given agents −i reveal their
signals, and given beliefs  −i(k(c)). These are illustrated in Figure 4. In this ﬁgure
beliefs with respect to the state of the world given the communication outcome c and
information revelation by all agents but i are (with slight abuse of notation) denoted with
p(A| (k(c)) = (1 −  −i(k(c)))p(A|κ = k(c) − 1) +  −i(k(c))p(A|κ = k(c) + 1). Consider
agent i : θi = θmin. Whenever this agent’s revelation of an α-signal has an eﬀect, this
eﬀect is beneﬁcial for agent i. The reason is that (as i is most biased towards a) whenever
the majority prefers a over b given all the available information, then i likes a better than
b as well. However, the revelation of a β-signal can have a beneﬁcial eﬀect for i only
if κ−i = kθmin. For κ−i < kθmin, all agents agree that b is the best choice, regardless of
i’s signal. For all κ−i > kθmin the revelation of a β-signal can only harm i. Given the
realization of the other agents’ signals, κ−i = ˆ k, the revelation of a β-signal will change the
majority decision from a to b if and only if the median of the preference types θm realized
within the interval [p(A|κ = ˆ k − 1),(1 −  −i(ˆ k))p(A|κ = ˆ k − 1) +  −i(ˆ k)p(A|κ = ˆ k + 1)],
that is if the Bayesian sincere voting strategies for the majority prescribe to vote for b in
case i reveals a β-signal, and prescribe to vote for a given the beliefs  −i(k(c)) if agent
i conceals his information. Note that the probability that the median voter’s preference
type realizes in the relevant range is highest, and hence the incentive to reveal a β-signal
is strongest for agent i : θi = θmin if out-of-equilibrium-beliefs assign probability 1 to
κ = kmin + 1 if κ−i = kmin. Note also that given this belief, i’s revelation of an α-signal
has no eﬀect on expected utility for κ−i = kmin.
We now quantify the eﬀect of information revelation versus information concealment
in a full information revelation equilibrium on i’s expected utility. First, we ﬁx the
realizations of the random variables and suppose that the revelation of a β-signal changes
the majority decision from a to b, given κ−i = ˆ k. The eﬀect on i’s expected utility is:
(1 − p(A|κ = ˆ k − 1))(ui(b,B) − ui(a,B)) − p(A|κ = ˆ k − 1)(ui(a,A) − ui(b,A))
= (ui(b,B) − ui(a,B) + ui(a,A) − ui(b,A))(θi − p(A|κ = ˆ k − 1)), (6)




i (θ), for n = 5, φ(θ) = U[0.1,0.9], θi = 0.9 (solid), and θi = 0.1 (dashed).
which is positive for (θi > p(A|κ = ˆ k−1)) and proportional to (θi−p(A|κ = ˆ k−1)). This
implies that whenever the smallest preference type gains from the revelation of a β-signal,
then every other type gains as well. Symmetrically, whenever the highest preference type
gains from the revelation of an α-signal, then every other type does so.
The probability which agent i assigns to the eﬀect (6) on his expected utility (i.e.
the probability assigned to the joint events κ = ˆ k − 1 and θm ∈ [p(A|κ = ˆ k − 1),(1 −
 −i(ˆ k))p(A|κ = ˆ k − 1) +  −i(ˆ k)p(A|κ = ˆ k + 1)]) depends on his own private information,
σi and θi.
Let φm
i (θ′) denote the probability which agent i assigns to the event that the median
voter has a type θ′ given his own preference type θi. It depends on his own type θi because
i is part of the sample drawn from φ(θ). φm
i (θ′) is given by (17)–(19) which are stated in
the appendix and depicted in Figure 5 for n = 5, and a uniform distribution on [0.1,0.9]
of individual preference types. The ﬁgure shows φm
i (θ) for θi = 0.1 and θi = 0.9.
Let  i(κ−i = k|σi) denote the probability which agent i assigns to the event that the
realization of the other agents’ signals yield κ−i = k given his own signal σi. Note that
an agent with an α-signal assigns a higher probability to high realizations of κ−i than an
agent with a β-signal because individual signals are correlated via the state of the world.
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Figure 6: Beliefs regarding the other agents’ signals given the own signal (n = 5, q = 0.8).
 i(κ−i = k|σi) is given by (20) and (21) in the appendix and depicted in Figure 6 for
n = 5 and q = 0.8. The ﬁgure shows  i(κ−i = k|σi) for σi = α and σi = β
Given that all agents −i reveal their information and hold beliefs  (k(c)), the eﬀect
of i’s revelation of a β-signal on expected utility is proportional to:
kθmax  
k=kθmin






and the eﬀect of the revelation of an α-signal on i’s expected utility is proportional to:
kθmax  
k=kθmin






As argued above, (8) is unambiguously positive for θi = θmin. Similarly, (7) is positive
for θi = θmax. In the following we derive conditions under which (7) is non-negative for
θi = θmin, and (8) is non-negative for θi = θmax.
26(7) is non-negative for θi = θmin iﬀ















and (8) is non-negative for θi = θmax iﬀ
















min(θ) is given by (19), φm
max(θ) is given by (17),  i(κ−i = k|β) is given by (21),
and  i(κ−i = k|α) is given by (20).
Obviously, (9) and (10) are necessary conditions for the existence of a full information
revelation equilibrium. Note that in case agent i’s expected utility is higher if he reveals
β (α) than if he conceals the information, then the same is true for agent j : θj > θi
(θj < θi) because j beneﬁts relatively more and looses relatively less than agent i whenever
the revelation has an eﬀect. Hence, conditions (9) and (10) are also suﬃcient for the
existence of a full information revelation equilibrium. That is, for the existence of a full
information revelation equilibrium in which agents vote Bayesian sincerely, it suﬃces to
make sure that the type who is most biased towards alternative a is willing to reveal a
β-signal and that the type who is most biased towards alternative b is willing to reveal
an α-signal.
If kθmin = kθmax, then (9) and (10) hold for any  −i(k(c)), as the left-hand-sides are
zero. It should be intuitively clear that there is no incentive to conceal information in this
case because kθmin = kθmax implies that there is essentially no preference heterogeneity,
i.e. voters agree on the mapping of information into the decision.
If kθmin < kθmax, then the right-hand-side of (9) increases, and the left-hand-side of (10)
decreases in  −i(kmin). Hence, out-of-equilibrium beliefs  −i(k(c)) best support the full
27information revelation equilibrium if  −i(kθmin) = 1. Similarly, out-of-equilibrium-beliefs
best support the full information revelation equilibrium if  −i(kθmax) = 0.
This observation yields suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a full information
revelation equilibrium, stated in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Consider a communication-and-voting-game in which the preference pa-
rameters θi are private information.
(i) There exists a full information revelation equilibrium if the preference parameters are
drawn from [p(A|κ = k − 1),p(A|κ = k + 3)] for all agents i and some even integer
k ∈ {−n + 1,...,n − 3}.
(ii) There exists a full information revelation equilibrium if the preference parameters are
drawn from [p(A|kθmin −1),p(A|kθmin +1)]∪[p(A|kθmax −1),p(A|kθmax +1)] for all agents
i and some even integers kθmin,kθmax ∈ {−n + 1,...,n − 1}.
Hence, full information aggregation is possible in heterogeneous committees if prefer-
ence heterogeneity is not too severe. For q = 0.8, a suﬃcient condition for the existence
of a full information revelation equilibrium is that preference types are drawn from the
interval [0.2,0.985]. That is, the committee may have members who need to be at least
80% sure that the state of the world is B in order to support alternative b as well as agents
who need to be 98.5% sure that the state of the world is A in order to support decision a
(and any preference type in between). Moreover, full information aggregation is possible
regardless of the quality of the signal if preference types assume only two values between
0 and 1, provided that there exist realizations of the signals for each type which convinces
him of either alternative (this can be achieved by increasing the number of committee
members).
If the conditions stated in Proposition 5 hold, out-of-equilibrium-beliefs can be deﬁned
such that a revelation has an eﬀect only if the preferences of the median voter are aligned
with the own preferences. However, even if information revelation has unfavorable eﬀects
in some cases, the eﬀect may still be favorable in expectation, such that (9) and (10)
hold for more heterogeneous preferences (as measured by θmax − θmin) than in part (i) of
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p(A|κ = k − 1) p(A|κ = k + 1)
? ?
￿ µ−i(k) ↓ - µ−i(k) ↑
p(A| −i(k))
      
      
      
      
θmin’s loss if θm ∈
θmax’s loss if θm ∈
Figure 7:  −i(k) determines the probabilities with which i looses from signal revelation.
the proposition and more general preference distributions than in part (ii). It is hard to
tell in general, which out-of-equilibrium-beliefs best support a full information revelation
equilibrium. Figure 7 illustrates how the out-of-equilibrium-beliefs aﬀect the incentives for
information revelation for the most biased committee members for κ−i = k  = kθmin,kθmax.
By decreasing  −i(k) for some k  = kmin,kmax, the incentive to reveal a β-signal increases
for type θmin because the probability that he will incur the loss p(A|κ = k − 1) − θmin
decreases. At the same time, the incentive for type θmax to reveal an α-signal decreases
because he will incur the loss θmax−p(A|κ = k+1) with a higher probability. The smaller
(higher) k, the higher the loss incurred by type θmax (θmin) in case the revelation of a
β-signal (α-signal) has an eﬀect. From this point of view,  −i(k) should be high for small
realizations of κ−i, and low for high values. However, type θmin, endowed with a β-signal,
assigns less probability to both events than type θmax with an α-signal, (i) the realization
of a high κ−i, and (ii) the realization of the median type in the relevant range (see Figures
5 and 6). Which of the two forces is stronger depends on the parameters of the model.
As the necessary conditions for the existence of a full information revelation equilibrium
can only be derived with knowledge of the most favorable out-of-equilibrium-beliefs, they
cannot be stated without further speciﬁcation of the model. We provide an example in
the appendix, where we show that the suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a full
information revelation equilibrium are not necessary.
We can again exclude other full information aggregation equilibria, if the full informa-
tion revelation equilibrium does not exist.
29Proposition 6 Consider a communication-and-voting-game in which the preference pa-
rameters θi are private information. If a full information revelation equilibrium does not
exist, then there exists no full information aggregation equilibrium.
Proof. A necessary condition for a strategy proﬁle to be a full information aggregation
equilibrium is that the decision is responsive to each signal. This requires informative
voting by those who did not reveal their signals. Then, all a-voters draw the same in-
ferences out of being pivotal, and all b-voters draw the same inferences when they are
pivotal. Hence, there is a k such that p(A|κ = k − 1) ≤ θi ≤ p(A|κ = k + 1) ∀i. A full
information revelation equilibrium exists. Q.E.D.
If preferences are private information, the preference parameter range for which a full
information revelation equilibrium exists is smaller than in the common knowledge case
(where it is unbounded), but larger than in the case in which committee members are
informed about other members’ preferences but can pretend to have no information. The
reason is that the median voter may agree even with the most biased committee members.
In the next section, we show that this eﬀect may allow for a larger preference parameter
range in case committee members can pretend to have no information.
4.3 Private preferences, possibility of receiving no signal
If there is the possibility of receiving no signal, we cannot support the full information
revelation equilibrium with out-of-equilibrium-beliefs anymore, because no action can be
identiﬁed as being out-of-equilibrium. As pointed out in Section 4.1, in a full information
revelation equilibrium the only admissible belief regarding i’s signal when observing ci = s
is σi = ∅. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a full information
revelation equilibrium are – analogously to (9) and (10):






























and θmin ∈ [p(A|kmin),p(A|kmin + 1)] and θmax ∈ [p(A|kmax),p(A|kmax + 1)].
Note that the necessary condition for the existence of a full information revelation
equilibrium in case preferences are common knowledge, kmin = kmax, (see Proposition 2)
is suﬃcient here. As in the previous section, committee members are uncertain about the
median voter’s preferences. If the probability that the majority has the same interests as
one’s own is high enough, committee members have an incentive to reveal their information
even if there are (potentially) conﬂicts of interest. We illustrate this possibility by means
of an example.
Consider a committee with three members, and suppose each of them receives a signal
from nature with probability δ. If an agent receives a signal, the signal is correct with
probability 0.8. Preference parameters θi are drawn from [0.2 + ǫ,0.8 − ǫ] according to a
uniform distribution. Suppose agents 1 and 2 reveal their information. If both reveal an
α-signal, then all agents agree the decision should be a regardless of agent 3’s information.
If both reveal a β-signal, then all agents agree the decision should be b regardless of agent
3’s information. Suppose agent 3 is endowed with a β-signal. This information will be
pivotal if (i) θm ∈ [0.2,0.5] and (a) agents 1 and 2 reveal diﬀerent signals, or (b) none of
the other agents received information, or (ii) θm ∈ [0.5,0.8] and one of the other agents
revealed an α-signal and the other agent did not receive information. If θ3 ∈ [0.2,0.5], the
revelation of the β-signal is beneﬁcial in case (i), but not in case (ii). If θ3 ∈ [0.5,0.8], the
revelation is beneﬁcial in both cases. Agent 3 : θ3 = 0.2 + ǫ (and hence all other types)
has an incentive to reveal a β-signal if
ǫ ∗ 3
4(δ2 ∗ 2 ∗ 0.8 ∗ 0.2 + (1 − δ)2) > (0.3 − ǫ) ∗ 1




8 (1 − δ)2 + 10
3 δ(1 − δ)
.
Because of the symmetry of the parameter constellation, the condition for the revelation
31of an α-signal for preference type 0.8 − ǫ is the same.
For values of δ close to 0 or 1, a full information revelation equilibrium exists for very
small ǫ. Independently of δ, the existence of a full information revelation equilibrium in
this example is guaranteed if θmin = 0.25, and θmax = 0.75. Note that for this preference
parameter range, there exists no full information revelation equilibrium in case preferences
are common knowledge. Summing up, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Consider two communication-and-voting-games Γc,Γp in which each voter
is endowed with a signal with probability δ < 1. The games are identical except that in
Γc, preferences are common knowledge, and in Γp, preferences are private information.
(i) If Γc has a full information revelation equilibrium, then Γp has a full information rev-
elation equilibrium.
(ii) There are parameter constellations such that Γp has a full information revelation
equilibrium, whereas no full information revelation equilibrium exists for Γc.
For δ < 1 the existence of a full information revelation equilibrium hinges upon vol-
untary information revelation by the players. As we have shown, the incentive to do so
may be greater in the light of uncertainty about the majority’s preferences. For δ = 1,
the event that a committee member does not reveal information arises in a full informa-
tion revelation equilibrium only of the equilibrium path. Information revelation can be
supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. If preferences are common knowledge, out-of-
equilibrium beliefs can be conditioned on the preferences of the deviating player, whereas
in the private information case, this is impossible.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a ﬁrst step towards the analysis of committees who deal with veriﬁ-
able information, and whose members have conﬂicting interests. We identiﬁed conditions
under which all decision-relevant information is revealed at the communication stage and
taken into account at the stage of voting. If preferences are common knowledge, and ev-
32ery committee member is endowed with information with certainty, then there exists an
equilibrium with these properties independently of the extent of preference heterogeneity.
If preferences are private information, then there exists a full information revelation
equilibrium if preference heterogeneity is not too severe. If preferences are common knowl-
edge, but agents are endowed with information only with a certain probability, then full
information aggregation is possible if and only if all voters agree how the information
should be mapped into a decision, i.e. if there are no conﬂicts of interest. Moreover, if
there is the possibility of receiving no signal then preferences being private information
allows for a larger extent of preference heterogeneity than the common knowledge case.
The reason is the possibility that the majority can have the same interests as oneself.
Our results may be used to analyze the quality of collective decisions in several ex-
tended frameworks. First of all, it is worth studying incentives for information acquisition.
In the present paper, information comes for free and in the basic model every commit-
tee member possesses private information with certainty. The impossibility to lie about
the realization of private signals allows the committee to deduce a member’s information
even if this member does not want the committee to be aware of it. This could weaken
incentives to acquire information in the ﬁrst place beyond the usually found free riding
problem.
If preferences are homogeneous ’enough’, we can expect eﬃcient information aggrega-
tion. However, information aggregation may be a problem if preferences are too hetero-
geneous (if there is the possibility that some agents are not endowed with information
and/or preferences are private information). Agents might want to exclude agents who
have preferences which are too distinct from their own from communication, while shar-
ing their information with more like-minded. There may be demand for a device which
allows agents to match into a homogeneous subgroup in order to pool information more
eﬃciently. It would be interesting to compare the eﬃciency of a system in which informa-
tion is pooled within subgroups (which may be interpreted as political parties) who are
represented by a single voice in the voting stage to the eﬃciency of information aggrega-
tion within a direct democracy.
33We used the simple majority rule as the decision mechanism. For homogenous prefer-
ences, there exists a unique best decision rule (Costinot and Kartik, 2006). An interesting
extension would be to take a mechanism design perspective in a setting with heterogenous
preferences. Suppose for instance an alternative needs a fraction q > 1/2 of the votes in
order to be implemented. If no alternative gets this fraction, then the status quo is main-
tained. Then, information α is pivotal in two cases: for changing the decision from status
quo to a, and for changing it from b to status quo. Full information revelation might be
possible for parameter ranges for which it is impossible using simple majority rule. The
optimal mechanism must trade-oﬀ the provision of incentives to reveal information versus
the risk of maintaining the status quo to often.
In our model, individual signals are – conditional on the state of the world – indepen-
dent random variables. This is a good assumption if committee members have diﬀerent
areas of expertise. In other cases, it might be more appropriate to allow for the possibil-
ity that the information contained in the agents’ signals partially overlaps. An example
would be the hiring committee, where some of the candidates’ characteristics are more
easily observable than others. The information environment could be modeled as a set
of veriﬁable signals, containing information about the alternatives at hand, out of which
nature draws a subset for each committee member. In such a setting (again referring to
the hiring committee), it would be particularly interesting to allow for a manipulation of
nature’s moves (inﬂuenced by the candidates’ actions) and to study the interaction with
committee members’ information acquisition eﬀorts.
Appendix
Derivation of Equation (2).
Given kα α-signals and kβ β-signals, Bayesian updating yields:








qkα−kβ + (1 − q)kα−kβ
34Deﬁning k = kα − kβ gives us:
p(A|κ = k) =
qk
qk + (1 − q)
k.
Derivation of Equation (3).
There are exactly k more α-signals than β-signals (k possibly negative) within the group
of voters except for i if there are exactly n−1+k
2 α-signals, and (the residuum) n−1− n−1+k
2
β-signals. We have to sum up all these cases:
 i(κ−i = k) =

      






 i(σj = α)
 
l∈{1,...n}\{J∪i}
 i(σl = β),
for k ∈ E{−n + 1,...,n − 1}
0, for k / ∈ {−n + 1,...,n − 1}.
Proof of Proposition 3.
First note that in a unanimous voting strategy proﬁle (conditional on the communication
outcome) as in the potential equilibrium, no single vote has an eﬀect on the outcome.
Hence there exists no proﬁtable deviation at the voting stage. Moreover, the voting
strategy proﬁle has the property that no private information (information which was not
revealed in the communication stage) will be aggregated in the voting stage. The collective
decision depends only on the evidence presented in the communication stage: x = a, if
k(c) ≥ k + 1, and x = b else.
In the following, we can take the decision rule as given. Note that the revelation of
an α-signal can only have the eﬀect to change the decision from b to a, and vice versa for
the revelation of a β-signal.
Agent i has an incentive to reveal an α-signal if and only if he believes that pi(ω =
A) ≥ θi conditional on the event that his revelation changes the decision from b to a, i.e.
conditional on the evidence being k without his revelation. He has an incentive to reveal
a β-signal if and only if he believes that pi(ω = A) ≤ θi conditional on the event that his
35revelation changes the decision from a to b, i.e. conditional on the evidence being k + 1
without his revelation.
γ∗ is a communication equilibrium (given the decision rule) iﬀ





σi, for σi = α




i ) ≥ θi, and pi(ω = A|β
piv
i ) > θi,
(ii) ∀i : γ∗
i (σi) = σi :
pi(ω = A|σi = α
piv
i ) ≥ θi ≥ pi(ω = A|β
piv
i ), and





s, for σi = α




i ) < θi, and pi(ω = A|β
piv
i ) ≤ θi,
where pi(ω = A|ˆ σ
piv
i ) denotes the probability i assigns to ω = A conditional on the event
that his signal ˆ σi is pivotal for the decision, taking as given the communication strategies
of agents −i and the decision rule. We will have a closer look at pi(ω = A|ˆ σpiv). It is
convenient to introduce some further notation.
Consider a (pure) communication strategy proﬁle γ. Denote Nβ(γ) = {i : γi(β) = β},
nβ(γ) = |Nβ(γ)|, Nα(γ) = {i : γi(α) = α}, nα(γ) = |Nα(γ)|. Denote with k−i(c) the
evidence provided by agents −i in the communication stage.
Given communication strategies γ−i, k−i(c) = k happens if (and only if) there are
k + l α-signals within the group of committee members other than i planning to re-
veal α, i.e. agents j ∈ Nα(γ∗) \ {i}, and l β-signals within the group of committee
members (other than i) planning to reveal β (agents j ∈ Nβ(γ∗) \ {i}), for all l =
max{0,−k},...,min{nα(γ∗)−k−1γ∗
i (α)=α,nβ(γ∗)−1γ∗
i (β)=β}, where 1x = 1 if x is true and
0 else. Abbreviate L(γ) = {max{0,−k},...,min{nα(γ∗)−k−1γ∗
i (α)=α,nβ(γ∗)−1γ∗
i (β)=β}
An α-signal is pivotal in state A with probability
prob{α
piv

















(δ(1 − q))l(1 − δ(1 − q))
nβ(γ∗)−1γ∗
i (β)=β−l.
36In state B, an α-signal is pivotal with probability
prob{α
piv





















































Analogously, k−i(c) = k + 1 happens if there are k + 1 + l α-signals within the group
of committee members other than i planning to reveal α, i.e. agents j ∈ Nα(γ∗) \ {i},
and l β-signals within the group of committee members (other than i) planning to reveal
β (agents j ∈ Nβ(γ∗) \ {i}), for all l ∈ L(γ∗) \ {−k ;nα(γ∗) − k − 1γ∗
i (α)=α}. Denote
L′(γ∗) = L(γ∗) \ {−k ;nα(γ∗) − k − 1γ∗
i (α)=α}.
A β-signal is pivotal in state A with probability
prob{β
piv





















In state B, a β-signal is pivotal with probability
prob{β
piv

















(δ(1 − q))k+1+l(1 − δ(1 − q))
nα(γ∗)−1γ∗
i (α)=α−k−1−l

































37We have that pi(ω = A|β
piv
i ) < pi(ω = A|α
piv
i ) ∀i. Hence, given the decision rule k, in
any communication equilibrium (in pure strategies) each voter reveals at least one type
of signal. Note that pi(ω = A|ˆ σ
piv
i ) is ceteris paribus higher (i) the higher k, (ii) the
lower nα(γ), and (iii) the higher nβ(γ). Note also that pi(.) are the same for i (given k)
for communication proﬁles γ′ and γ′′ if nα(γ′) − nβ(γ′) = nα(γ′′) − nβ(γ′′) and γ′
i = γ′′
i .
Further note that pi(ω = A|ˆ σ
piv
i ) = pj(ω = A|ˆ σ
piv
j ) if γi = γj.
Consider a communication proﬁle γ. Denote the belief pi(ω = A|α
piv
i ) of an agent
who reveals both types of signals (if endowed with them), i.e. agent i : γi(σi) = σi with
pα(γ) and pi(ω = A|β
piv
i ) with pβ(γ). Similarly, denote the beliefs of an agent who reveals
α and conceals β, i.e. agent i : γi(α) = α,γi(β) = s with pβ−conc
α (γ) and p
β−conc
β (γ),




β (γ), respectively. It is easy to verify that p
β−conc
ˆ σ (γ) > pˆ σ(γ) > p
α−conc
ˆ σ (γ), ˆ σ = α,β.
Concerning the position of pα−conc
α (γ) and p
β−conc
β (γ), we have to distinguish three cases:
(i) If δ < δ′(q), we have
p
α−conc
β (γ) < pβ(γ) < p
β−conc
β (γ) < p
α−conc
α (γ) < pα(γ) < p
β−conc
α (γ),
(ii) if δ′(q) < δ < δ′′(q), we have
p
α−conc
β (γ) < pβ(γ) < p
α−conc
α (γ) < p
β−conc
β (γ) < pα(γ) < p
β−conc
α (γ),
(iii) if δ > δ′′(q), we have
p
α−conc
β (γ) < p
α−conc
α (γ) < pβ(γ) < pα(γ) < p
β−conc























1/2 . The three cases are de-
picted in Figure 8. In case (i), the information contained in any committee member’s
silence plays a minor role, because the endowment with information is relatively unlikely.
Hence, beliefs are mainly determined by revealed information and the own signal. As the
endowment with information becomes more likely, communication strategies of the other
committee members gain importance whereas the own information endowment becomes













































Case (iii): δ > δ′′
Figure 8: Structure of the committee members’ beliefs.
suppose that δ = 1 and suppose that nα agents other than i reveal α and nβ agents other
than i reveal β. Agent i’s α is pivotal if k+l α-signals and l β-signals are revealed – which
implies that (n − 1 − nα − l) α-signals and (n − 1 − nβ − k − l) β-signals are concealed.
Hence, i can infer that κ = 2k+nβ −nα −1. He makes the same inference if he is pivotal
with a β-signal. The two situations diﬀer in that there must be an agent who has an α in
the former, and a β in the latter case. As i has a β in the former and an α in the latter
case, κ is inferred to be the same.
A communication proﬁle γ is a communication equilibrium if
(i) every agent reveals at least one type of signal,
(ii) ∀i : θi < pα−conc
α (γ∗) : γ∗
i (α) = α,
(iii) ∀i : θi > p
β−conc
β (γ∗) : γ∗
i (β) = β,
(iv) ∀i : θi > pα(γ∗) : γ∗
i (α) = s, and
(v) ∀i : θi < pβ(γ∗) : γ∗
i (β) = s.
39We proof existence by constructing communication proﬁles together with a decision
rule k such that conditions (i)-(v) are met for cases (ii) and (iii). For case (i), existence
is not guaranteed.

















The decision rule k is chosen in such a way that the median preference type is willing
to reveal both types of signals if there are as many other agents revealing α as there are
revealing β.10 The above conditions (i)-(v) hold for the following communication proﬁle:
∀i : θi < θm : γi(α) = α,γi(β) = s; ∀i : θi > θm : γi(α) = s,γi(β) = β; i : θi =
θm : γi(α) = α,γi(β) = β. We have nα(γ) = nβ(γ) = n+1
2 . Hence γ is an equilibrium
communication proﬁle with the property stated in the proposition.
Consider case (ii). Let the decision rule k be such that pα−conc
α ≤ θm ≤ p
β−conc
β for
nα = nβ.11 The following communication proﬁle is an equilibrium: ∀i : θi < θm : γi(α) =
α,γi(β) = s; ∀i : θi > θm : γi(α) = s,γi(β) = β; i : θi = θm : γi(α) = α,γi(β) = β. Again,
we have nα(γ) = nβ(γ) = n+1
2 .
Consider case (i). Choose k such that p
β−conc
β ≤ θm ≤ pα−conc
α if nα = nβ. Construct
the communication proﬁle as follows: First, let agents i : θi ≤ pα−conc
α reveal α and
agents i : θi ≥ p
β−conc
β reveal β, and let all all other information be concealed. Note that
nα,nβ ≥ n+1
2 . If nα = nβ, the communication proﬁle is an equilibrium. If nα > nβ,
modify the communication proﬁle for agents i : pβ ≤ θi ≤ p
β−conc
β : let min{nα − nβ,|{i :
pβ ≤ θi ≤ p
β−conc
β }|} of them reveal β in addition to the revelation described above. The
new communication proﬁle is an equilibrium with the properties stated in the proposition
if nα − nβ ≤ |{i : pβ ≤ θi ≤ p
β−conc















 k, such a k might not exist. In this case, we can
ﬁnd a k together with |nα − nβ| = 1 such that the above inequalities hold. The following arguments
are analogous, hence we restrict ourselves to the case that θm is such that a k exists for which both
inequalities hold.
11If such a k does not exist, it exists for |nα − nβ| = 1 or 2.
40communication equilibrium in general.
It remains to be shown that |k| < |km|. To see this, note that in equilibrium, θm ∈













. Given decision rule k, for δ → 0,















2k−nα−nβ+1. Hence, in the equilibria which we consider |k| is at most |km| and
the lower the higher δ. Q.E.D.
41Probability agent i assigns to θm = θ′.






























2 (1 − Φ(θi))
n−1
2 , (18)



















Probability agent i assigns to κ−i given σi.
For σi = α:



































  ˆ k
2 (1 − q)
 , (20)
and for σi = β :



































  ˆ k
2 (1 − q)
 , (21)
where E{−n + 1,...n − 1} is the set of even numbers between (including) −n + 1 and
n − 1, and  i(κ−i = k′|σi) = 0 for odd values k′.
Necessary and suﬃcient condition for full information revelation: Example.
Consider a committee with three members, each of whom receives a signal which is correct
with probability 0.8. We know from Proposition 5 that a full information revelation equi-
librium exists if the preference parameters are drawn from [0.2,0.985] or from [0.015,0.8].
Suppose preferences are drawn from a uniform distribution which is symmetric with re-
spect to 1/2. We identify the minimum θmin (and therewith the maximum θmax) for which
42a full information revelation equilibrium exists. Existence is guaranteed for θmin ≥ 0.2,
and obviously, we must have θmin > 0.015, otherwise the most biased types’ preferred
alternative does not depend on the realization of the signals. Hence, we consider the
case 0.015 < θmin < 0.2 As outlined above, out-of-equilibrium-beliefs best support a full
information equilibrium, if (i) probability 1 is assigned to κ = −1 in case ci = s and
k(c) = −2, and (ii) probability 1 is assigned to κ = 3 in case ci = s and k(c) = 2. Because
of symmetry, out-of-equilibrium-beliefs for the case ci = s and k(c) = 0 assign equal
probability to κ = −1 and κ = 1. Again because of symmetry, existence is guaranteed
if type θmin has an incentive to reveal a β-signal. Type θmin has an incentive to reveal a
β-signal if
(1/2 ∗ 0.8
3 + 1/2 ∗ 0.2
3)(θmin − 0.015)Φ(0.2)(1 − Φ(0.2)) ≥
(1/2 ∗ 0.8 ∗ 0.2
2 + 1/2 ∗ 0.2 ∗ 0.8
2)(0.2 − θmin)(Φ(0.5) − Φ(0.2)(1 − Φ(0.5))
⇔ 0.26(θmin − 0.015)(0.2 − θmin)(0.8 − θmin) > 0.08(0.2 − θmin)(0.5 − (0.2 − θmin))0.5
⇔ θmin ≥ 0.10446.
Note that the suﬃcient condition stated in Proposition 5 allows for potential conﬂicts of
interests (as measured by θmax − θmin) of 0.785 for this example, whereas the necessary
and suﬃcient condition allows for 0.79.
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